By Stean A.N. Tshiband, JD, MCR.
Abstract
The Security Council renews
five non-permanent member States every year. Although this exercise has become
part of the customs within the General Assembly, the organ that elects
non-permanent member States, this year’s elections sparked protests from the
DRC and some international non-governmental organizations. Beyond these
protest, this paper examines the impact of Rwanda’s entry in the Security
Council on peace and security in the Great Lakes region, particularly Eastern
DRC. Drawing lessons from the past, this paper tends to analyze benefits and
Rwanda’s non-permanent seat in the Security Council.
In October 2012, the International Community elected five new
non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for a period of two years as
it is always the case every year. The election of Luxembourg, Argentina, South Korea, Australia and Rwanda
would have gone unnoticed if the latter was not involved in a controversy that
involves the very essence of the very mandate of the Security Council –
maintenance of international peace and security. The election of Rwanda sparked
vigorous protests from the Government of the Congo (DRC) and some International
Non-Governmental Organizations (Huffington Post, 19 October 2012).
While recognizing the right of the DRC to protest about Rwanda’s seat
in the UNSC, it is also important to mention Rwanda’s right, to have a non-permanent
seat in the Council as every other member State of the United Nations. However,
important questions need to be asked. Why should Rwanda sit or not sit in the
Security Council as a non-permanent member? What does this election represent
in terms of values advocated by and representing the United Nations? And most
of all, what will be the impact of this election on peace, security and
stability within the Great Lakes Region of Africa, particularly Eastern DRC?
Seating in the Security
Council
Before attempting to provide answers to these questions, it is
important to remember that the UNSC is one of the most important organs of the
United Nations and has the primary responsibility to maintain international
peace and security (UN Charter Art 24[1]). It is composed of fifteen members,
five of which are permanent (USA, UK, France, China and the Russian Federation)
and ten non-permanent elected for a two-year term (UN Charter Art. 23[2]).
To be elected, Member States’ candidacy for a non-permanent seat in
the UNSC are presented by their regional organizations and approved by the UN
General Assembly with, at least, two-third (129 out of 193) of votes to obtain
the seat (UNSC 2012). Rwanda’s bid for a seat was endorsed and presented by the
African Union two years ago in replacing South Africa, whose membership is
expiring on December 31, 2012 (UNSC 2012). South Africa currently holds one of
the three seats allocated to the African bloc region. Every year, five Member
States make their entry in the Security Council.
Although not mentioned in the Charter, aspiring member state are
expected to demonstrate higher standards and values imbedded in the Charter and
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.
The Significance of Rwanda
on International Peace and Security
Rwanda is not only the country known by the 1994 genocide. It is the
sixth major made significant contribution as Troop and Police Contributing
Country (TCC) to Peacekeeping operations (UNSC2012).
It has a strong interest in the thematic issue of women, peace and security,
including a focus on combating sexual violence against women and empowering
women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding (UNSC2012). Rwanda can
also be praised for its impressive recovery from the Civil War that resulted in
the genocide. Around eight hundred thousand Tutsis and moderate Hutus were
killed between April and July 1994. Rwanda is also seen as a very good example
for its development and anti-poverty policies.
While the above achievements advocate for Rwanda as a model at all
fronts of the UN programs, a very big shadow is cast upon it from its human
rights record and involvement in the destabilization of Eastern DRC. The actual
Rwandan regime is often pointed at for its political repression of members of
the opposition. One will remember the involvement of Rwanda alongside Uganda in
the so-called war of national liberation waged under the banner of the Alliance
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) that overthrew the
Mobutu regime and later in the “seven-nation war”, also called the African
world war between 1998 and 2003 (Longman 2002: 129-144). From 1996, Rwanda is
mentioned every time the territorial integrity and peace are threatened in
Eastern DRC. The 2007 – 2009 Laurent Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defense
of Peoples (CNDP) armed conflict, the continuing plunder of natural resources
and violence in the Kivu provinces and the current Congolese Revolutionary Army
(ARC), the former M-23 movement attacks have all pointed at Rwanda as the main
instigator.
The White elephant: Rwanda’s
Denial
Rwanda has always been pointed as the mastermind behind the ADFL, the
Goma-based Rally for Democracy (RCD) rebellion, the CNDP and the M23 movement. In
spite of massive damning facts clearly indicating its involvement in the Eastern
DRC, Rwanda continued to deny the facts. Let us recall a few facts:
-
At
the beginning of the ADFL rebellion, Rwanda denied its involvement in the
“liberation movement”. The first war also called the ‘war of liberation’ was
planned and carried out Rwanda and Uganda (Meredith 2011: 555 - 585). Congolese
and the ADFL were a façade to put up to make it appear as an anti-Mobutu
rebellion. Despite the presence of Rwandan troops and the ostensible power grip
by Rwandan subjects, Rwanda never officially acknowledged having invaded its
giant neighbor. The current Defense Minister, James Kabarebe, even assumed
functions of the chief of Staff of armed forces in the newly “liberated” Zaire,
then re-baptized The democratic Republic of the Congo under Laurent Desire
Kabila(Meredith 2011: 555-585). Rwanda’s national security was the major drive
that justified the so-called war of liberation (Tshiband 2009; Nzongola-Ntalaja
2004).
-
History
may recall that Rwandan forces played an important role in the onset of the
second war that resulted in the partition of the country. James Kabarebe was
the commander of an operation that would seize power by force. He commandeered
a private jetliner to ferry Rwandan troops from Goma to the military base of
Kitona (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004). Despite the ostensible presence of Rwandan
troops in the Congo, Rwanda rejected any claim it had invaded its neighbor. The
attitude of the international community played an important role in Rwanda’s
attitude. With the exception of France, almost all major powers chose to ignore
the fact. Even after the signature of the final peace agreement, Rwanda never
disengaged in the Congo, probably due to economic benefits it drew from the
crisis.
-
The National
Congress for the Defense or People (CNDP) is another of what is believed
another of Rwandan creations in Eastern DRC. Facts on the ground indicated that
the insurgency was orchestrated and carried out by Rwanda. The CNDP was
supposedly a Congolese movement and staged an armed conflict to “protect Banyamulenge populations from exactions
and attacks they suffered from FDLR, according to the movement, since Congolese
authorities failed to disarm them (New York Times, 21 January 2011). It was
also believed that his rebellion was staged to protect Rwandan interests in the
Kivu provinces, namely natural resources exploitation (New York Times, 21
January2011). He also helped secure the Rwandan border and residents from FDLR
raids (Huffigton Post, 3 January 2009). It also said that his movement
controlled a 21000 sq. Km territory (Huffington Post, 3 January 2009). Despite
being a renegade, Laurent Nkunda gained popularity among local residents.
However, the DRC and Rwanda came together to track down the Hutu-FDLR rebels,
sidelining Nkunda, who was later apprehended in Rwanda and kept under house
arrest since then. There are few in his arrest that remain unclear:
o Why has Nkunda been held under house
arrest without any apparent charge against him?
o Why did Rwanda quickly arrest its protégé?
Was he the ‘sacrificial lamb’ on the altar of Congo-Rwanda reconciliation?
Unless it is a façade arrest and tactical move by Rwanda to secure its
interests. It is believed that Nkunda has been lately allowed to use his phone
and contact former CNDP troop’s men integrated in the Congolese army to defect
and apparently join the M23 (UNSC 2012).
o His deputy, General Bosco Ntanganda, who
is also wanted by the ICC on crimes against humanity charges, was left free and
was even promoted. Latest information about the CNDP indicated that there were
disagreements between Bosco and Nkunda. It is even believed that the former was
planning a coup to oust Nkunda from the CNDP. The current leader of the
Congolese Revolutionary Army, formerly known as the M23, Sultani Makenga has
close ties with Nkunda. Does it mean Nkunda is leading behind the stage?
One thing is sure, there is much to the
arrest of Nkunda that remains known only to the Rwandan regime. Nkunda’s background
alone tells a lot on Rwandan involvement. In fact Laurent Nkunda He began his military
career as an intelligence officer for the RPF and remained within its ranks
throughout the campaign that led the Tutsi-led RPF to power in Rwanda (New York
Times, 21 January 2011). He also joined troops that entered Zaire under the
ADFL to topple Mobutu from power. He later joined the Goma-based RCD before
being integrated in the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), from which he broke
and created the CNDP. Nkunda was arrested since January 2009 in Rwanda. Rwanda
refused to execute the request for extradition issued by the Congolese
Government. A UN report (UNSC 2008) provided indications of possible links
between the Rwandan President’s Office and the CNDP.
-
The
M23 movement, which was started by Col. Sultani Makenga, an ex-CNDP combatant
loyal to Laurent Nkunda. The UN interim report (UNSC 2012) alleged that the
latter, despite being under house arrest, was allowed to call his former
companions and sympathizers in a move to convince them to join the M23. The
same report also alleged that key members of the Rwandan government provided
support to the M23 movement. This support supposedly consists of logistics
(armament), recruitment and training of troops. Rwandan troops are even
suspected to have taken part in fighting against Congolese troops in North Kivu.
Instead of providing counter-evidence to the report, Rwanda is trying attacking
the credibility of the panel of experts and their methodology. A report on
Aljazeera states (Ajazeera 2012):
“Rwanda
has furiously denied the claims made in the report's annex and turned to their
usual means of doing so: attacking the report’s methodology as well as its
release before Rwandan officials had the chance to respond. Unfortunately for
Kigali, the Group of Experts relied on a heightened standard for evidence, requiring
five independent, eyewitness accounts for any information included in the
report. This testimony, plus photographs of ammunition that could not have come
from DRC, is damning for Rwanda, as is the sudden strengthening of M23 and
reports from defectors that many M23 fighters speak English. If the report is
true - and there is no credible reason for independent observers to believe it
is not - it means that Rwanda is in violation of United Nations sanctions
against supplying weapons to Congolese armed groups”
Rwanda has also rejected calls to condemn
the M23 movement as requested by the major part of the international community.
Rwanda’s presence in Eastern DRC has persisted since late 1996.
Genuine concerns for the security of a newly established authority in Rwanda
might have been the main reason of launching a campaign in the DRC. This raison d’Etat progressively gave in to a
campaign for natural resources. Rwanda is not expected to easily acknowledge
its involvement in the destabilization of the DRC since main reasons of
national security have long eroded and gave way to economic ones. Acknowledging
its ostensible presence will amount to a mea
culpa for violations of International Law treaties which Rwanda is party
to.
National Security: A Key to
Profiteering and Parasitism
Although Rwandan national security remained a priority, Rwanda’s
motivation for the second war was driven by the resources (Nzongola-Ntalaja
2004). The FDLR issue became secondary in Rwanda’s campaigns in Eastern DRC
(APPG 2002). What was true for the second Rwandan crusade in the DRC remains
evident to this day. The presence of Hutu-FDLR rebels in eastern Congo may
still represents a threat to the Rwandan national security, but this is no
longer a major security threat for Rwandan authorities. The Hutu-FDLR rebels
destabilize an important part of Eastern DRC. They have on their account the
vilest cases of systematic and organized sexual violence in the provinces of
North and South Kivu, many other crimes against humanity, war crimes, wanton destruction
of property and environment, plunder of natural resources and much more and so
forth. Their presence affects much more the DRC than it represents a threat to
Rwanda. Local populations even talk about them more as an organized criminal group
rather than an armed group per se.
The FDLR renounced to any offensive action against Rwanda in 2008 and
decided remain on defensive action, if attacked. It seems they are more
satisfied with plundering natural resources in the Congo than re-conquering
their native Rwanda. In addition, many among the FDLR rebels represent a new
generation that did not take part to the 1994 genocide, they were either born
in exile or were young children at the time of the genocide. Analysts suggest
that national security is just an umbrella or a pretext used by Rwanda to
destabilize the Congo. Some even mentioned that the stabilization and
pacification of eastern Congo will prevent Rwanda from economic profits it
draws from an unstable DRC richly endowed with natural resources. It would be
easy to ask the question:
A qui profite
le crime?
Just as other neighboring countries, Rwanda profits from the
instability that the DRC suffers in many ways. Taxes paid for the transit of
smuggled and illegally exploited resources, direct investment by groups and
individuals involved in the plunder, side business investment related to shadow
and illicit trade of resources from eastern DRC. The de facto partition of the country led to an unprecedented illegal
exploitation of natural resources (Meredith 2011:555-585). Paul Kagame even
called the war in the DRC self-sustaining; i.e. resources needed by troops in
the DRC were financed by the presence of the very troops on the ground. One
will wonder how. That is through the illegal exploitation of natural resources,
of course. Not only Rwandan forces were present in the DRC, they also set
criminal networks that are still exploiting natural resources in the Kivu
provinces. To elicit the importance of natural resources in multiple Rwandan campaigns
in Eastern DRC, one will notice that there were no documented instances when
Rwandan troops attacked the FDLR rebels. On the contrary, the APPG report
(2002) indicates that RPA and RCD ignored information about FDLR rebels. On
occasion, it was even alleged that RPA and RCD even colluded with them over the
extraction and trading of natural resources (APPG 2002).
Another fact of
capital importance to determine the importance of natural resources over in
choices made by Kigali is that there were little engagements between
belligerents, but heavy fighting erupted in many occasions between Rwandan and
Ugandan forces within the DRC over the control of natural resources
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004). It is also said that the question of natural resources
in the eastern DRC represents a national security issue. Natural resources are
of utmost importance and are an issue of state policy, unlike Uganda who
favored personal gain of officers assigned in the DRC (Longman 2002:129-44;
Turner 2007; UNSC 2003). In fact, Rwanda even established the “Congo Desk”, an
official structure that was in charge of proceeds from natural resources from
the Congo. The Congo Desk of the Department of External Relations monitored
operations concerning the exploitation of natural resources in the Congo from
Kigali (Tshiband 2009; UNSC 2003; Longman 2002: 129-144). It was in
particularly charge of delivering licenses and had the upper hand over
operations. It was reported that to a five per cent return of the proceeds was
to be paid to the Desk be granted a monopoly in diamond trading and other
activities. The Congo desk represented a kind of tender board through which all
proceeds from the DRC were processed (Tshiband 2009).
The heavy toll that is paid by civilians revolves around the natural
resources. The acquisition and control of resources is always one of the most
tragic parts of the plunder. Most reports on Congo’s natural resources
highlighted the massive violations of human rights, killings, expropriation,
corruption, and much more during every phase, from extraction to export
(Tshiband 2009). Zones controlled by troops close to Rwanda are not exempt of
this harsh reality faced by civilian populations.
Some politicians in the Kinshasa fear that Rwanda is trying to create
a partition of the Congo in a move to append it as part of its territory. This
eventuality would resolve two issues: land scarcity and natural resources.
Rwanda is one of the countries in Africa that has the highest density of
population per square kilometer. It is also said that Kigali does not want to
see a stable Eastern DRC. An unstable Eastern DRC is more profitable to
Rwanda’s economy. However, Rwanda does not need an unstable Eastern DRC to draw
profits from natural resources.
The Banyamulenge issue
The Banyamulenge and other Rwandophone communities are part of the
ethno-linguistic landscape of the DRC for decades. Some of them are believed to
have settled in the DRC since 1881 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004b). Others emigrated
from Rwanda during the Hutu revolution of 1959. Although they settled in the
DRC for decades, their citizenship has always been at the center of a debate,
mostly from politicians trying to use a nationalist sentiment to seek election
or acquire a popular base. The citizenship of the Banyamulenge remains a sensitive question and had known different
fortunes. In the 1990s, the national TV organized a series of debates on the
subject. The subject sparked boisterous and emotional debate among
participants. This series of debate has remained active among some members of
ethnic groups believed to be rightful natives of the Congo.
In 1972,
President Mobutu signed a decree to granting Zairian citizenship as of 30 June 1960 to all people from Rwanda and Burundi
who had established residence in Kivu before 1 January 1950 and lived in the
Congo since then (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004b). Many of these subjects were moved to
mining zones and occupied key posts in Gécamines in the Katanga, for instance.
In 1981, the parliament repealed the 1972 decree and replaced it with a law on
citizenship, which defines a citizen as someone who is a descendant of an
ethnic group found in the country within its borders as of 1 August 1885
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004b). The citizenship of many Rwandophones became uncertain. The law did not sanction a general
exclusion of Rwandophones from the
Zairian citizenship. Those with recognizable structures of customary authority
and relatively uncontested land such as the Tutsi Banyamulenge of South Kivu should qualify under this law as
Congolese citizens (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004b). This is not the understanding of
many Congolese to this day. In fact, many of them, with the help of
opportunistic and less scrupulous politicians, believe Tutsis are not Congolese
citizens.
Rwanda or any
other State sharing these ethno-linguistic groups does not have prerogatives of
violating International Law or destabilizing the DRC on the ground of
protecting the ethnic Congolese Tutsis. Rwanda’s involvement with Tutsi-led
rebel movements did not help much in the integration of the Banymulenge. Rwanda’s engagement in
Eastern DRC is even harmful to them. Their acceptance as rightful Congolese
citizens becomes seriously damaged exposing them to more threats from other
communities on the ground that they are Rwandan subjects. They speak the same
language, have the same physical appearance and hold same cultural beliefs. It
would be difficult for anyone to easily distinguish who is and who is not
Congolese.
Birth in the
Congo does not automatically confer Congolese citizenship. Congolese
citizenship is regulated according to the jus
sanguinis doctrine, which requires one of the parents to be Congolese
citizens for a child to claim citizenship. Children of Banyamulenge can rightfully claim the Congolese citizenship
regardless of where they were born as guaranteed by the constitution.
Citizenship is one of those sovereignty issues. No State
can compel another to grant citizenship to all or part of a community. In the
event the DRC would fail to deliver its obligations to protect individuals or
groups within its territory, international provisions on the protection of
civilians are in place and should be upheld. Rwanda or Uganda cannot justify
any of their moves by the protection of the Banyamulenge.
The potential impact of
Rwanda’s non-permanent UN Security Council seat the Congolese Diplomacy
Beyond what is perceived as an award for multiple violations of
International Law, the main issue with Rwanda seating in the Security Council
lies on how it will affect regional dynamics and efforts to stabilize large
chunk of the Congolese territory in North and South Kivu provinces. The
presence of Rwanda in the Security Council will definitely affect how the
situation in the great Lakes Region of Africa is handled, but how will it
affect security council transactions? How is Rwanda expected to play a key role
the maintenance of international peace and security while it is suspected of torpedoing
the same right next door? This is the key question that is tormenting many of
those who are skeptical about the positivity of Rwanda’s two-year non-permanent
seat. Let us explore few possibilities.
The presence of Rwanda in the Security Council confers it some
responsibilities, such as exemplarity on its dealing with issues that come on
the table of each of the 15 member States. Rwanda may choose to adopt an
approach that reduces its interactions with destabilizing forces in Eastern
DRC. This approach will not resolve the Kivu quagmire, but will give some space
for peaceful initiatives to take roots. The disengagement of Rwanda, albeit
partial, will have positive impact on the ground. Being a member of the
Security Council, Rwanda may also choose a positive approach that is to
positively seek ways to resolve the situation in Eastern DRC, drawing more attention
on a region it comes from and inviting other member States, particularly the
five permanent members to get more involved. This approach will affirm Rwanda’s
position in seeking peace though its contribution to peacekeeping and, this
time peacemaking.
La charité bien
ordonnée commence par soi-même.
Rwanda’s responsibility for peace starts from within the Great Lakes region.
Rwanda may still choose to continue its current activities in Eastern
DRC. Not only it will dispose of privileges of vote, but may also rally other
Member States to defend its position. Despite being non-permanent member,
Rwanda’s entry in the Security Council will have a very big impact on its
diplomacy and the weight it is acquiring internationally. In fact, Rwanda has a
very strong and aggressive diplomacy and does not hesitate to utilize the
international community’s guilt and sympathy because of the genocide to bring
forward its case. Rwanda also knows how to positively shape the international
public opinion in its favor. The combination of these factors will provide
Rwanda a quasi-veto power.
On the contrary, the Congolese diplomacy seems to have failed. In
spite of having tangible elements pointing Rwanda’s responsibility in the
current instable situation in the Kivu provinces, it has not been able to
advocate its case the right way. Since the fall of Mobutu, one of the main
weaknesses of the DRC lies in its weak public opinion shaping. The voice of the
DRC has become inaudible, even inside the DRC. In many instances, the government
failed to protest and take active measures to curb violence in Eastern DRC.
Many believe it is due to the institutional corruption that has gangrened
politics and governance in the country. In fact, many military and civilian
authorities entertain shadow and criminal networks in Eastern DRC (Tshiband
2009). The war itself is a lucrative business. Fabricated, overinflated bills,
under-the-table business are the daily routine in the DRC. In some cases, the
government pays for goods or services that are never supplied. In other cases,
government official sell weapons to the very rebels they are fighting. While
millions suffer from conflicts, a few people within the power circle in
Kinshasa draw huge profits from it. In the current state of affairs, why would
they end the conflict?
Another failure of the Congolese diplomacy is that it was not able to
convince the African Union and the international community of the inopportunity
of Rwanda’s membership in the UNSC, at this stage. It is not even sure they even
attempted to do so. Protesting after votes have been cast is not only
unproductive, but represents the old-fashioned and inefficient foreign policy.
From the way the reception the Congolese position was voiced, no positive
result can be expected.
Conclusion
Rwanda’s growing regional and international influence coupled with its
membership in the Security Council may represent a positive or crippling factor
in prospects for the settlement of the conflict and the stabilization of
eastern DRC depending on choices authorities take and the level of
international pressure. It may become
the golden opportunity to resolve the conflict or a means for Rwanda to get
away with multiple violations of International Law in the DRC.
Rwanda may choose to capitalize on its presence in the Security
Council to shape an even better image of a country that has emerged from one of
the most unimaginable forms of violence and a country that would use its
experience to eradicate violence and hate, both recipes for instability. The
situation in the Kivu provinces will represent a threat to neighboring
countries if not contained and resolved. It is a time bomb that only waiting to
explode. Creating a no-man’s-land in Eastern DRC will not only invite groups
that are controllable by Rwanda or any other GLR country, but may favor the
establishment of uninvited and unwanted groups that may prove dangerous for the
stability for the entire region. In addition, some groups may see their
influence grow and decide to enfranchise from their backers and even threaten
them.
Eastern DRC has been affected by a series of interminable armed
conflicts since 1996. The death toll from these conflicts is estimated at more
than six million people since the onset of the conflicts. In larger part,
Rwanda holds the key to the stability of eastern Congolese provinces of the
Kivus. Once external interferences are removed, Congolese can, then the
internal process of healing wounds and transformation.
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